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ABSTRACT
GAMES OF SHARING AIRPORT COSTS
YU¨KSEL, Ays¸e Mu¨ge
M.A., Department of Economics
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Tarık Kara
August 2009
In this study, noncooperative games defined for various cooperative solution
concepts in airport problems have been addressed. The existence of a relation-
ship between the design of the games and the equilibrium outcomes has been
investigated.
This study explores the conditions where, in a noncooperative game designed
with downstream-subtraction consistent or uniform-subtraction consistent solu-
tion concept, the cost allocation proposed by this cooperative solution concept
appears as the Nash outcome. Then, the uniqueness of this equilibrium has been
examined.
Keywords: Airport problems, Downstream-subtraction consistency, Uniform-
subtraction consistency, non-cooperative games.
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O¨ZET
HAVAALANI MALI˙YETLERI˙NI˙N PAYLAS¸IMI
OYUNLARI
YU¨KSEL, Ays¸e Mu¨ge
Yu¨ksek Lisans, Ekonomi Bo¨lu¨mu¨
Tez Yo¨neticisi: Yar. Doc¸. Tarık Kara
Ag˘ustos 2009
Bu tez c¸alıs¸mamızda havaalanı problemlerinde c¸es¸itli is¸birlikc¸i c¸o¨zu¨m kavram-
ları ic¸in tanımlanan is¸birlikc¸i olmayan oyunlar ele alınmıs¸tır. Oyunun nasıl olus¸-
turuldug˘u ile ortaya c¸ıkacak denge durumları arasında bir ilis¸ki olup olmadıg˘ı
aras¸tırılmıs¸tır.
As¸ag˘ı akım eksiltmede tutarlı veya biro¨rnek eksiltmede tutarlı olan bir c¸o¨zu¨m
kavramı ile kurulacak is¸birlikc¸i olmayan bir oyunda Nash c¸ıktısı olarak yine bu
is¸birlikc¸i c¸o¨zu¨m kavramının o¨nerdig˘i maliyet dag˘ılımının ortaya c¸ıkacag˘ı kos¸ullar
aranmıs¸tır. Ardından bu dengenin teklig˘i incelenmis¸tir.
Anahtar kelimeler: Havaalanı problemleri, As¸ag˘ı akım eksiltmede tutarlılık,
Biro¨rnek eksiltmede tutarlılık, I˙s¸birlikc¸i olmayan oyunlar
iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to express my gratitude to Prof. Tarık Kara, my professor and
then my supervisor, by whom I was introduced to Game Theory, for his guid-
ance, invaluable support, and mostly for his patience and tolerance. I would like
to thank Prof. Semih Koray whose support and stimulating suggestions and en-
couragement helped us all the time. It has been a great honour for me to be a
student of them.
Furthermore, I am also grateful for the support and encouragement of Prof.
Arno Riedl from Maastricht University, my family, my friends Mehtap Anayurt,
U¨stu¨n O¨zgu¨r, Aylin Tokuc¸ and Engin Durgun, and for financial support of
TU¨BI˙TAK.
v
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
O¨ZET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
CHAPTER 2: PRELIMINARIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2 Solution Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.3 The Noncooperative Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
CHAPTER 3: EQUILIBRIA IN NONCOOPERATIVE GAME . 11
3.1 Downstream-Subtraction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.2 Axioms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.4 Uniqueness of the Equilibria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.5 Three-Agent Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.6 First Agent Proposer Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
CHAPTER 4: ANOTHER NONCOOPERATIVE GAME . . . . 35
4.1 New Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
4.2 Uniform-Subtraction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
vi
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Airport problems are those problems which have been introduced first by Lit-
tlechild and Owen (1973) and illustrated by the airport and the irrigation ditch
examples so far. In the airport example, there are several airline companies.
These companies are the agents, which need an airstrip for take offs and land-
ings of their planes. Since the companies own different types of planes, they are
in need of airstrips of different lengths. However they can also make use of an
airstrip which is longer than their needs. Therefore, an airstrip with the length
of the need of the company which needs most would fulfill the needs of all of the
companies.
Companies, in other words the agents, agree on maintaining a strip jointly
and sharing the cost of building the strip. However, the cost of building a strip
increases with the length of the strip. They build a strip which has a length equal
to the maximum of what each company needs. Now, how much should each of
the companies contribute? This is a fair division problem. Should everyone
contribute equally or should they contribute proportional to their needs? If not,
how should they share the total cost?
Another important example concerning airport problems is about building
an irrigation ditch. There is a path with a water source at the beginning of
it and along the path there are several fields . In this problem, agents are the
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ranchers and each of them needs a ditch from the water source to her field. The
cost of constructing a ditch goes up with the length of it. Fields are at different
distances to the source; hence agents need ditches of different lengths. Agents
agree on building a ditch from the source to the furthest field for common use.
We are concerned about how the cost of irrigation ditch construction should be
distributed among the ranchers.
Two problems mentioned above are identical for a game theorist. In airport
problems, when needs of an agent are fulfilled then all agents with smaller needs
are also satisfied. This is an important distinction from similar problems, such
as bankruptcy problems.
From the structure of the airport problem, we already know that all needs
will be met. It is only the amount that each agent will pay, which is left to be
determined. An allocation is a plan which indicates how much each agent should
pay. Every agent prefers an allocation where she pays less to another allocation
where she pays more. Nevertheless, every agent is indifferent to others paying
more or less.
An airport problem is represented by the agents and their needs. A solution
concept is a rule which gives an allocation for each airport problem. Solution
concepts are characterized by its desired properties like efficiency, consistency
and monotonicity. In literature, we see numerous solution concepts (see Thomson
(2005) for a survey).
For any airport problem, an associated noncooperative game can be defined
using a selected solution concept. Now, we will briefly describe the game.
The furthest rancher from the source proposes an allocation to every rancher
in sequence starting from the neighbor rancher who owns the field next to hers.
At every stage, the furthest rancher from the source makes a proposal to an
agent. The agent in question can either accept or reject. If she accepts, she
pays the amount allocated to her in the proposal to be spent on building this
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amount’s worth of ditch. If there is already a piece of ditch built by any other
agent in previous stages passing through this rancher’s field, then construction
starts from the end of that piece towards the source. If such a piece does not
exist, her contribution is used for building a piece of ditch starting from her field
in the direction of the source.
If she rejects, a two-person airport problem is defined for the proposer and her.
Their costs in this problem are calculated as follows: If any of these two ranchers
use a piece of the ditch previously built, then the cost of that piece is subtracted
from her cost. Also, contributions assigned by the proposal to the agents closer
than the responder to the source will be subtracted from the proposer’s and the
responder’s initial costs. Then, the selected solution concept is applied to this
two-person problem and the contribution of the responder is determined. With
this contribution, a piece of ditch is built as described above. The amount of
her contribution replaces the amount allocated to her in the proposal. On the
contrary, in the new proposal the contributions of the ranchers except these two
do not differ from the previous proposal. Additionally, the proposal is adjusted
for the proposer in a way that the total amount of contributions suggested by
this new proposal is equal to the total cost of building an irrigation ditch which
serves for the needs of each and every agent. In the next stage, the next agent
faces this adjusted proposal.
When all agents are done by responding, the furthest rancher pays for the
uncovered parts and the ditch is completed. Lastly adjusted proposal shows how
much each agent contributed and is referred as the outcome of this game.
For any solution concept and any given airport problem we have a cooperative
solution which is chosen by the solution concept and a set of Nash outcomes of
the noncooperative game defined using the solution concept. Here, a natural
question arises: How are the cooperative solution and the set of Nash outcomes
related?
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In a recent paper, Arin et al. (2007) define two games for airport problems
using slack maximizer and constrained equal contributions solution concepts in
turn. They show that under slack maximizer solution concept, the coopera-
tive solution is the unique Nash outcome of the associated noncooperative game.
They also show that under constrained equal contributions solution concept, the
cooperative solution is in the set of Nash outcomes.
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate if these results hold in a gen-
eral context. Our results are valid for all solution concepts which satisfy certain
conditions, not only for some specific solution concepts. These conditions are
downstream-subtraction consistency and some other axioms related to mono-
tonicity, which will be defined later.
Under the conditions mentioned above, the cooperative solution is always
in the set of Nash outcomes. However, Nash outcomes are not always unique.
Also, if the cooperative solution is always in the set of Nash outcomes, this
does not imply that the solution concept satisfies all the conditions mentioned
above. These results are presented in chapter 3. Then, three-agent problems are
examined as a special case. Questions for further research can be found at the
end of the chapter.
In chapter 4, the noncooperative game defined above is modified. In this new
game, when an agent makes her contribution a piece of ditch is built starting from
the source,or from the point where the previous piece of ditch ends if it exists,
towards the furthest rancher. Under specific conditions, the cooperative solution
is proven to be in the set of Nash outcomes. Under more restrictive conditions
such as uniform-subtraction consistency which will be defined in chapter 4, the
cooperative solution is the unique Nash outcome.
Arin et al. (2007) uses the noncooperative games for extending the solution
concepts defined for two-person airport problems to n-person case. Nevertheless,
those games can also be used as an implementation tool under the settings in
4
which cooperation cannot be attained.
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CHAPTER 2
PRELIMINARIES
2.1 The Model
In our model, we have a finite set of agents, represented by I = {1, 2, . . . , n}
and a vector of cost parameters, denoted by c ∈ RI+. ci refers to agent i’s cost
parameter. For simplicity, we set c1 ≤ c2 ≤ · · · ≤ cn. An airport problem is first
mentioned in Littlechild and Owen (1973) and is defined as a pair (I, c) . All
airport problems makes up the set C.
An allocation for (I, c) is a vector x ∈ RI+ such that 0 5 x 5 c and∑
i∈I xi = cn, where xi is the payment made by agent i. This equality is called
the efficiency condition . The set of all allocations for (I, c) is denoted by X (I, c).
An allocation x ∈ X (I, c), satisfies no-subsidy requirement if and only if for
each I ′ ⊆ I, ∑j∈I′ xj ≤ maxj∈I′ cj. Equivalently, x ∈ X (I, c), satisfies no-subsidy
requirement if and only if for each i ∈ I, ∑j∈I:cj≤ci xj ≤ ci.
For any airport problem (I, c),the set of allocations that satisfy no-subsidy
requirement, is also called the set of core allocations, denoted by Core(I, c).
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2.2 Solution Concepts
A solution concept S : C → X (C), maps every airport problem (I, c) to an
allocation x ∈ X (I, c). Note that a solution concept is single-valued.
We mainly talk about seven solution concepts. These are: sequential equal
contributions (SEC), sequential full contributions (SFC), constrained equal con-
tributions (CEC), constrained equal benefits (CEB), constrained proportional
(CP), slack maximizer (also called the nucleolus) and priority rule.
Under sequential equal contributions solution concept, SEC, every agent who
uses a given segment contribute equally to the cost of that segment.
Definition. For each airport problem (I, c) ∈ C and each i ∈ I,
SECi(I, c) ≡ c1
n
+
c2 − c1
n− 1 + . . .+
ci − ci−1
n− i+ 1 .
Equality is the aim of constrained equal contributions concept, CEC, where
no-subsidy requirement is still fulfilled.
Definition. For each problem (I, c) ∈ C and each i ∈ I,
CECi(I, c) ≡ min
{
ci −
∑
j∈I:j<i xj
1
, . . . ,
cn−1 −
∑
j∈I:j<i xj
n− i ,
cn −
∑
j∈I:j<i xj
n− i+ 1
}
.
Constrained equal benefits solution concept, CEB, focuses on each agent’s net
benefit instead of her contribution.
Definition. For each game (I, c) ∈ C and each i ∈ I,
CEBi(I, c) ≡ max{ci − β, 0}
where β ∈ R+ is chosen such that
∑
i∈I max{ci − β, 0} = cn.
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Under sequential full contributions solution concept, SFC, agents arrive in the
order of increasing cost parameters and each agent pays for the segment which
has not been covered before her. Agents with equal cost parameters contribute
equally to their common segmental cost.
Definition. For each problem (I, c) ∈ C and each i ∈ I, let I i(c) ⊆ I be defined
by I i(c) ≡ {j ∈ I : cj = ci} . Then,
SFCi(I, c) ≡

ci
|I i(c)| if ci = minj∈I cj
ci −maxj∈I:cj<ci cj
|I i(c)| otherwise
Under constrained proportional solution concept, CP, for a given problem
(I, c) ∈ C, we define
ρ1 ≡ min
k∈I
{
ck∑
l∈{1,...,k} cl
}
, k1 ≡ max
k∈I
{
k :
ck∑
l∈{1,...,k} cl
= ρ1
}
.
Each agent i ∈ {1, . . . , k1} pays ρ1ci. Then we define
ρ2 ≡ min
k∈{k1+1,...,n}
{
ck − ck1∑
l∈{k1+1,...,k} cl
}
,
k1 ≡ max
k∈{k1+1,...,n}
{
k :
ck − ck1∑
l∈{k1+1,...,k} cl
= ρ1
}
.
Each agent i ∈ {k1 + 1, . . . , k2} pays ρ2ci. We proceed likewise until cn is
collected.
Any permutation of the elements in I is an order on I. In this context, an
order ≺ shows the order of arrival (or leave). For any two agents i, j ∈ I, j ≺ i
is interpreted as agent j arrives (or leaves) before agent i.
Under priority rule, D, agents arrive in a given order ≺. Each agent fully
pays for all segments she needs which has not been covered before.
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Definition. Let ≺ be a given order on I. For each problem (I, c) ∈ C, and each
i ∈ I,
D≺i (I, c) ≡ max
{
ci − max
j∈I:j≺i
cj, 0
}
.
Slack maximizer solution concept, SM, is also called the nucleolus.
So¨nmez (1994) shows that slack maximizer of any problem (I, c) ∈ C can be
computed by the following formula:
Definition. For any (I, c) ∈ C and i ∈ I,
SMi(I, c) ≡

min
{
ci −
∑
j∈I:j<i xj
2
, . . . ,
cn−1 −
∑
j∈I:j<i xj
n− i+ 1
}
if i 6= n
cn −
∑
j∈I\{n}
SMj(I, c) if i = n
Each of these seven solution concepts always gives us an allocation which
satisfies no-subsidy requirement (Thomson (2005)).
A convex combination of solution concepts is also a solution concept, since
the set of allocations X (I, c) is convex for each problem (I, c).
2.3 The Noncooperative Game
We proceed by defining a noncooperative game which was first introduced by
Arin et al. (1997).
We start with an airport problem (I, c) and a solution concept S.
Agent n makes a proposal, namely an allocation for the problem, x1 ∈ X (I, c)
(In Arin et al. (1997) the proposal needs not to satisfy x 5 c.) Agents respond
in an order according to their costs. Agent n− 1 responds first, agent 1 responds
last.
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Each agent has two possible actions. She can either accept or reject the
proposal she is facing. If she accepts, she pays what is assigned to her by the
proposal and leaves. If she rejects, then a new problem for the proposer and the
rejector is considered. Their cost parameters are changed as explained below and
the solution concept S is applied to this two-agent problem. S determines the
amount that the rejector will pay.
At stage t, agent i faces the proposal xt−1. If agent i accepts she pays xt−1i
and leaves. If agent i rejects, then the two-person airport problem is defined for
{i, n}, where costs are as follows:
c′n = x
t−1
n + x
t−1
i = cn −
∑
j:j<i
xt−1j −
∑
j:i+1≤j≤n−1
xt−1j
c′i =
ci −∑
j:j<i
xt−1j − max
l:i+1≤l≤n−1
( ∑
j:i+1≤j≤l
xt−1j − (cl − ci)
)
+

+
(We denote max {a, 0} by a+)
Note that c′i ≤ c′n.
For the next stage, the proposal is adjusted. If agent i accepted, xt = xt−1. If
agent i rejected, for any j ∈ I,
xtj =

xt−1n + x
t−1
i − Si ({i, n} , c′) if j = n
Si ({i, n} , c′) if j = i
xt−1l otherwise
When all agents are done with responding at stage T the allocation xT is
realized, the proposer pays the rest. We denote this game by G(I, c, S).
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CHAPTER 3
EQUILIBRIA IN THE NONCOOPERATIVE
GAME
3.1 Downstream-Subtraction
Given an airport problem (I, c) and a solution concept S, let x ≡ S(I, c). Let
i ∈ I and I ′ ≡ I\ {i}. Define d(I, i, c, x) as the airport problem with the agent
set I ′, and cost vector c′ ∈ RI′+, where c′ is calculated as follows: For any agent
j ∈ I ′,
c′j ≡

min {cj, ci − xi} if cj < ci
cj − xi if cj ≥ ci
This process is called downstream-subtraction1. Note that, for any pair of
agents j, k ∈ I ′, if cj ≤ ck then c′j ≤ c′k.
A solution concept S, is called downstream-subtraction consistent if and only
if for each airport problem (I, c) and each i ∈ I with I ′ = I\ {i}, x ≡ S(I, c)
implies xI′ = S(d(I, i, c, x))
Among the solution concepts we have listed above, four of them satisfies
downstream-subtraction consistency. Those are sequential full contributions, con-
strained equal contributions, slack maximizer and priority rule (Thomson (2005)).
1Potters and Sudho¨lter (1999)
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Claim 1. Let (I, c) be an airport problem, x ∈ X (I, c), and I¯ ⊂ I. Now agents in
I\I¯ leave the game in an order ≺ and we apply downstream subtraction repeatedly.
Let (I¯ , c′) denote the new problem obtained by this process.
Let (I¯ , c¯) denote the reduced problem obtained by applying downstream sub-
traction repeatedly to the problem (I, c), where agents in I\I¯ are leaving in the
order ≺¯.
Then c′ = c¯. In other words, order of leave is not important in downstream-
subtraction.
Proof. Let (I, c) be an airport problem and x an allocation for this problem. Let
I¯ ⊆ I and agents in I\I¯ leave with an order ≺. Pick i, j ∈ I\I¯ such that i and j
leaves consecutively in ≺. Say, agent i leaves first.
Define ≺¯ by keeping everybody in the same order as in ≺, but this time
replacing the order of agent i and agent j. Without loss of generality assume
i < j. Fix an arbitrary k ∈ I such that k ∈ I¯ or k leaves later than agent j with
respect to ≺. At each stage, one agent leaves and costs are adjusted according to
downstream-subtraction. We obtain c′ (t) at any stage t by subtraction in order
≺ and c¯(t) at stage t by subtraction in order ≺¯.
Before it is agent i’s turn to leave in ≺, the ordering is same for ≺ and ≺¯,
so at that stage there is no difference between c′ (t) and c¯′ (t). In the following
equations, t stands for t steps of reduction before i or j leaves.
c′i(t) = c¯i(t) = βi
c′j(t) = c¯j(t) = βj
c′k(t) = c¯k(t) = βk
We will cover three different cases.
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i) Let k < i < j.
We then have ck ≤ ci ≤ cj. Since we reach c′ (t) by applying downstream-
subtraction t times and downstream subtraction preserves this ordering we know
c′k(t) ≤ c′i(t) ≤ c′j(t). Similarly, c¯′k(t) ≤ c¯′i(t) ≤ c¯′j(t).
Reduction in ≺:
When i leaves:
c′k(t+ 1) = min {βk, βi − xi} ,
c′j(t+ 1) = βj − xi.
When j leaves:
c′k(t+ 2) = min {min {βk, βi − xi} , βj − xi − xj} ,
= min {βk, βi − xi, βj − xi − xj, } .
Reduction in ≺¯:
When j leaves:
c¯k(t+ 1) = min {βk, βj − xj} ,
c¯i(t+ 1) = min {βi, βj − xj} .
When i leaves:
c¯k(t+ 1) = min {min {βk, βj − xj} ,min {βi, βj − xj} − xi}
= min {βk, βj − xj, βi − xi, βj − xj − xi}
= min {βk, βi − xi, βj − xi − xj} .
ii) Let i < k < j
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Reduction in ≺:
When i leaves:
c′k(t+ 1) = βk − xi,
c′j(t+ 1) = βj − xi.
When j leaves:
c′k(t+ 2) = min {βk − xi, βj − xi − xj} .
Reduction in ≺¯:
When j leaves:
c¯k(t+ 1) = min {βk, βj − xj} ,
c¯i(t+ 1) = min {βi, βj − xj} .
When i leaves:
c¯k(t+ 2) = min {βk, βj − xj} − xi = min {βk − xi, βj − xj − xi} .
iii) Let i < j < k.
Reduction in ≺:
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When i leaves:
c¯k(t+ 1) = βk − xi,
c¯j(t+ 1) = βj − xi.
When j leaves :
c¯k(t+ 2) = βk − xj − xi.
Reduction in ≺¯ :
When j leaves :
c¯k(t+ 2) = βk − xi − xj.
We observe that in all cases c′k(t+ 2) = c¯k(t+ 2).
Since k was chosen arbitrarily, this holds for all remaining agents. Hence we
conclude that repeated downstream-subtraction in two different orders give the
same reduced problem if one of the orders is obtained from the other order by
only switching two agents who leave consecutively.
Since I is finite, ≺ is a finite order. Any permutation of a finite order can
be obtained by repeated swaps of consecutive elements. This is easy to see. ≺
is a permutation of elements in I\I¯. Let ≺′ be another permutation of the same
elements. Take the first element in ≺′, say α1. Start with ≺. Replace α1 with
the element that comes before it. Continue until α1 gets to the first place and
call this new ordering ≺1.
Now take the second element, say α2, in ≺′. Start with ≺1. Swap α2 with the
element that comes before it. Continue until α2 gets to the second place.
If we continue likewise and do this for all elements we obtain ≺′ from ≺ by
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repeated swaps of consecutive elements. Therefore, we conclude that no matter
in which order the agents leave, we get the same reduced game after repeated
downstream-subtraction of a set of agents.
Claim 2. Let (I, c) be an airport problem, x be an allocation which satisfies no
subsidy requirement for this problem. For any i ∈ I\ {n}, define c′ as:
c′n = xn + xi,
c′i =
[
ci −
∑
j:j<i
xj − max
l:i+1≤l≤n−1
[
∑
j:i+1≤j≤l
xj − (cl − ci)]+
]
+
.
The game ({i, n}, c′) is obtained from (I, c) by repeated downstream-subtraction
of all agents other than i and n with respect to x.
Proof. Choose an i ∈ I\{n}. Let the agents 1, 2, ..., i−1 leave first, then i+1, i+
2, ..., n− 1 leave in this sequence.
In the parentheses, we state the last agent who left, to show which stage we
deal with.
After agents 1, 2, ..., i− 1 leave
ci(i− 1) = ci −
∑
j:j<i
xj,
ci+1(i− 1) = ci+1 −
∑
j:j<i
xj,
ci+2(i− 1) = ci+2 −
∑
j:j<i
xj,
. . .
After agent i+ 1 leaves
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ci(i+ 1) = min
{
ci −
∑
j:j<i
xj, ci+1 −
∑
j:j<i
xj − xi+1
}
,
ci+2(i+ 1) = ci+2 −
∑
j:j<i
xj − xi+1,
ci+3(i+ 1) = ci+3 −
∑
j:j<i
xj − xi+1,
. . .
After an arbitrary agent k leaves (where k > i)
ci(k) = min
l:i<l≤k
{
ci −
∑
j:j<i
xj, cl −
∑
j:j<i
xj −
∑
i+1≤j≤l
xj
}
,
cn(k) = cn −
∑
j:j<i
xj −
∑
j:i+1≤j≤k
xj.
When all agents except i and n leave
cn(n− 1) = cn −
∑
j:j<i
xj −
∑
j:i+1≤j≤k
xj = xn + xi.
The last equation is due to
∑
j∈I xj = cn.
Let i < n− 1. After n− 1 leaves,
ci (n− 1) = min
l:i+1≤l≤n−1
{
ci −
∑
j:j<i
xjcl −
∑
j:j<i
xj −
∑
j:i+1≤j≤l
xj
}
.
No subsidy requirement is satisfied by x, so ∀ l s.t. i < l ≤ n−1,∑j:j<i xj ≤ ci
and
∑
j:j<l xj ≤ cl . Hence cl −
∑
j:j<i xj −
∑
j:i<j≤l xj ≥ 0 . So, ci (n− 1) is
non-negative. Then we have
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ci (n− 1) = ci −
∑
j:j<i
xj + min
l:i+1≤l≤n−1
{
0, cl − ci −
∑
j:i+1≤j≤l
xj
}
= ci −
∑
j:j<i
xj − max
l:i+1≤l≤n−1
( ∑
j:i+1≤j≤l
xj − (cl − ci)
)
+
=
ci −∑
j:j<i
xj − max
l:i+1≤l≤n−1
( ∑
j:i+1≤j≤l
xj − (cl − ci)
)
+

+
since ci (n− 1) is non-negative.
We have the desired result for the case i 6= n− 1.
If i = n− 1 then
ci −
∑
j<i
xj − max
l:i+1≤l≤n−1
( ∑
j:i+1≤j≤l
xj − (cl − ci)
)
+︸ ︷︷ ︸
0

+
= ci−
∑
j:j<i
xj = cn−1−
∑
j:j<n−1
xj
which is equal to what we obtain by repeated subtraction of all agents who
come before n− 1.
Hence for any i ∈ I\ {n}, ({i, n} , c′) can be obtained from the original problem
(I, c) by repeated downstream-subtraction. We have shown it for a specific order,
but using Claim 1 we conclude that this holds for any order.
3.2 Axioms
Definition. A solution concept S satisfies weak cost monotonicity if and only if
for any pair of airport problems (I, c) and (I, c′) s.t. c′ = c+ c′′ where (I, c′′) ∈ C,
we have S (c′) ≥ S (c).
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Five out of our seven solution concepts satisfy weak cost monotonicity. Only
CEB and CP do not satisfy (Thomson (2005)).
Axiom 1. Let ({i, j} , c) be an airport problem, i < j, S be a solution concept. We
assume that S satisfies weak cost monotonicity for the two agent case. This means
for any ({i, j} , c′′) and ({i, j} , c′) ∈ C s.t. c′ = c+c′′, Si ({i, j} , c′) ≥ Si ({i, j} , c)
and Sj ({i, j} , c′) ≥ Sj ({i, j} , c).
Since we have
Si ({i, j} , c′) + Sj ({i, j} , c′) = c′j and
Si ({i, j} , c) + Sj ({i, j} , c) = cj
we obtain
Si ({i, j} , c) + c′′j ≥ Si ({i, j} , c′) and
Sj ({i, j} , c) + c′′j ≥ Sj ({i, j} , c′) .
To check if CP satisfies our axiom, we calculate:
CP1 ({1, 2} , c) = c1c2
c1 + c2
≤ (c1 + c
′′
1) (c2 + c
′′
2)
c1 + c′′1 + c2 + c
′′
2
= CP1 ({1, 2} , c′) ,
CP2 ({1, 2} , c) = c
2
c1 + c2
≤ (c2 + c
′′
2)
2
c1 + c′′1 + c2 + c
′′
2
= CP2 ({1, 2} , c′) .
Hence CP satisfies Axiom 1.
Note that in weak cost monotonicity and in Axiom 1, we considered a change
in cost vector such that for each i ∈ I\ {1} the segmental cost, defined as xi−xi−1,
ends up at least as much as before. So in Axiom 1, we consider the cost vector
changes where c′′i ≤ c′′j . To check if CEB satisfies our assumption we calculate:
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CEB ({1, 2} , c) =
(c1
2
, c2 − c1
2
)
and
CEB ({1, 2} , c′) =
(
c1 + c
′′
1
2
, c2 + c
′′
2 −
c1
2
− c
′′
1
2
)
.
Both of them are at least as large as before, since c′′1, c
′′
2 ≥ 0 and c′′2 ≥ c′′1.
Therefore all of the seven solution concepts described above satisfy Axiom 1.
Note that, Axiom 1 also implies that if both cost parameters decrease by the
same amount, any agent cannot pay more than before.
Definition. A solution concept S satisfies individual cost monotonicity if and
only if for any pair of airport problems (I, c) and (I, c′), and for each i ∈ I, where
c′i ≥ ci and for each j ∈ I\ {i} , c′j = cj, we have Si (c′) ≥ Si (c).
Axiom 2. Let ({i, j} , c) be an airport problem where ci < cj, S be a solution
concept. We assume that for any airport problem ({i, j} , c′) s.t. c′j = cj and
ci < c
′
i ≤ cj, we have Si (c′) ≥ Si (c).
Individual cost monotonicity implies Axiom 2, but it is stronger. All seven
solution concepts described above except for the sequential full contributions
solution concept satisfy individual cost monotonicity (Thomson (2005)), hence
they satisfy Axiom 2. SFC does not satisfy Axiom 2 since
S1 ({1, 2} , (3, 4)) = 3 < 2 = S1 ({1, 2} , (4, 4)) .
3.3 Results
A noncooperative game G (I, c, S) is defined above, however outcomes, utilities
and strategies are not discussed explicitly. Outcome of this game is the payment
vector we obtain in the end, xn−1, which is the final version of the proposal
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adjusted after each rejection, before the next agent makes her move. (Game lasts
n− 1 stages, since at the each stage one agent makes her decision.)
Utilities are equal to the benefits, i.e. for any outcome x ∈ X of the game
G (I, c, S) and for each i ∈ I, ui (x) = ci − xi. Since ci is given, each agent tries
to minimize her payment. Agent n can propose any allocation in the beginning.
So the strategy set of agent n is X (I, c). Agent n has infinitely many possible
strategies.
For any other agent i ∈ I, i 6= n, possible actions are accept or reject. How-
ever, an agent decides to accept or reject any proposal she may face, so her set
of strategies is again infinite. A strategy for each agent i ∈ I, is a single-valued
function δi : X (I, c)→ {Accept,Reject}, which assigns a response to any pro-
posal agent i may face. The strategy set of agent i consists of all such functions.
Proposition 1. Let (I, c) be an airport problem, G (I, c, S) be a related nonco-
operative game, where S satisfies the Axiom 1. Let y ∈ X (I, c) be offered by
agent n in the beginning of the game and x ∈ X (I, c) be the outcome, when all
agents responded rationally. Then accepting is a best response for all responders
i ∈ I\ {n}, when x is proposed directly in the first stage by agent n.
Proof. Consider agent n−1. When y is proposed by agent n, she chooses between
two options: If she accepts, she pays yn−1. If she rejects she pays
Sn−1
(
{n− 1, n} ,
(
cn−1 −
∑
j:j<n−1
yj, cn −
∑
j:j<n−1
yj
))
.
Minimum of these two is equal to xn−1, since it will be adjusted as xn−1.
When x is proposed by agent n, agent n − 1 again has two options: If she
accepts, she pays xn−1. If she rejects she pays
Sn−1
(
{n− 1, n} ,
(
cn−1 −
∑
j:j<n−1
xj, cn −
∑
j:j<n−1
xj
))
.
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For all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n− 1} , we have yi ≥ xi. So,
∑
j:j<n−1 yj ≥
∑
j:j<n−1 xj.
Therefore, ∃∆n−1 ∈ R+ s.t.
∑
j:j<n−1 yj =
∑
j:j<n−1 xj + ∆n−1. Observe that
(
cn−1 −
∑
j:j<n−1
yj, cn −
∑
j:j<n−1
yj
)
+∆n−1 =
(
cn−1 −
∑
j:j<n−1
xj, cn −
∑
j:j<n−1
xj
)
.
By Axiom 1,
Sn−1
(
{n− 1, n} ,
(
cn−1 −
∑
j:j<n−1
yj, cn −
∑
j:j<n−1
yj
))
≤
Sn−1
(
{n− 1, n} ,
(
cn−1 −
∑
j:j<n−1
xj, cn −
∑
j:j<n−1
xj
))
.
Therefore
xn−1 ≤ Sn−1
(
{n− 1, n} ,
(
cn−1 −
∑
j:j<n−1
xj, cn −
∑
j:j<n−1
xj
))
.
Hence accepting would be a best response for agent n−1, when x is proposed.
Now consider an arbitrary agent k ∈ I, k 6= n. When y is proposed by agent
n in the first stage, agent k faces the proposal
(y1, y2, . . . , yk, xk+1, . . . , xn−1, cn −
∑
j:k+1≤j≤n−1
xj −
∑
j:1≤j≤k
yj).
If she accepts, she pays yk. If she rejects, she pays Sk ({k, n} , c′), where
c′n = cn −
∑
j:j<k
yj −
∑
j:k+1≤j≤n−1
xj,
c′k =
ck −∑
j:j<k
yj − max
l:k+1≤l≤n−1
( ∑
j:k+1≤j≤l
xj − (cl − ck)
)
+

+
.
When x is proposed, assume that all agents from n− 1 to k + 1 accepted. So
x is not changed. Agent k faces x. She has two options: If she accepts she pays
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xk. If she rejects she pays Sk ({k, n} , c¯), where
c¯n = cn −
∑
j:j<k
xj −
∑
j:k+1≤j≤n−1
xj,
c¯k =
ck −∑
j:j<k
xj − max
l:k+1≤l≤n−1
( ∑
j:k+1≤j≤l
xj − (cl − ck)
)
+

+
.
The same logic applies here.
∑
j:j<k
xj ≤
∑
j:j<k
yj, so ∃∆k ∈ R+ s.t.
∑
j:j<k
xj + ∆k =
∑
j:j<k
yj.
Observe that c¯n = c
′
n + ∆k and c¯k ≥ c′k, c¯k − c′k ≤ ∆k. Hence, Sk ({k, n} , c′) ≤
Sk ({k, n} , c¯) by Axiom 1.
This implies xk ≤ Sk ({k, n} , c¯) therefore accepting would be a best response
for agent k, when x is proposed.
As a result, x would be accepted if it is proposed by agent n in stage 1.
Corollary. Let (I, c) be an airport problem, G (I, c, S) be a related noncooperative
game, where S satisfies Axiom 1. If x is a SPNE outcome of G (I, c, S), then there
exists a SPNE where x is proposed by n and accepted by all agents.
Proof. If x is a SPNE outcome, that means agent n is able to collect at most∑
i∈I\{n} xi from the rest. He collects the same amount by proposing x. So, this
corollary directly follows from Proposition 1.
Claim 3. If a solution concept S satisfies downstream-subtraction consistency,
then for any problem (I, c), S always give us an allocation which satisfies no-
subsidy requirement.
Proof. Let (I, c) be an arbitrary airport problem, S be a solution concept which
satisfies DS consistency. Denote S (I, c) = x.
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A solution concept always give an allocation, so by definition 0 ≤ x ≤ c.
Therefore x1 ≤ c1.
Let agents leave the game in an increasing order. At each stage we apply
downstream-subtraction w.r.t. x. At an arbitrary stage k, agent k’s cost parame-
ter is ck−
∑
i:i<k xi. Since S is DS consistent agent k pays xk in the reduced game
too. Therefore xk ≤ ck −
∑
i:i<k xi. This implies ∀k ∈ I\ {n} ,
∑
i:i≤k xi ≤ ck.
Also
∑
j:j≤n xj = cn. We conclude that ∀ i ∈ I,
∑
j≤i xi ≤ ci, i.e. x satisfies no
subsidy requirement.
Theorem 1. Let (I, c) be an airport problem, G(I, c, S) be a related noncoopera-
tive game, where S satisfies Axiom 1,2 and downstream-subtraction consistency.
Now S(I, c) is a SPNE outcome of the game G(I, c, S).
Proof. Consider a strategy profile in which agent n proposes s = S(I, c) at stage
1, each responder chooses the option which asks her to pay less, and she chooses
‘Accept’ if she is indifferent. Using Claim 2, the small problem defined for agents
n and n − 1 is a reduced problem of (I, c) obtained by repeated downstream-
subtraction with respect to s. Since S is DS consistent, agent n − 1 will be
indifferent, so she will choose accept, proposal will not be changed. Proceeding
in this manner, we see that each responder will be indifferent, so accepting is a
best response.
We assigned the option ‘Accept’ when an agent is indifferent. Note that this
choice was arbitrary. If some or even all of the agents reject, the proposal again
will not be changed.
Let agent n collect the maximum amount she can collect from the rest when
responders act rationally, by proposing an allocation z, where the outcome of the
game is y. By Proposition 1, we know that there is a SPNE where y is proposed
by n and accepted by all the other agents.
Assume sn 6= yn. Define k = {maxj∈I j : j 6= n, yj 6= sj}. Agent k pays
min{yk, sk({k, n}, c′)} = yk where
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c′n = cn −
∑
j:j<k
yj −
∑
j:k+1≤j≤n−1
sj,
c′k =
ck −∑
j:j<k
yj − max
l:k+1≤l≤n−1
( ∑
j:k+1≤j≤l
sj − (cl − ck)
)
+

+
.
when y is proposed.
Agent k pays min{sk, sk({k, n}, c¯)} = sk = Sk({k, n}, c¯) where
c′n = cn −
∑
j:j<k
sj −
∑
j:k+1≤j≤n−1
sj,
c′k =
ck −∑
j:j<k
sj − max
l:k+1≤l≤n−1
( ∑
j:k+1≤j≤l
sj − (cl − ck)
)
+

+
.
when s is proposed.
i) Let yk > sk.
If
∑
j:j<k sj ≤
∑
j:j<k yj, then ∃∆ ∈ R+ s.t
∑
j:j<k yj ≤
∑
j:j<k sj + ∆. Now
c¯n = c
′
n+∆, c¯k ≥ c′k and c¯k−c′k ≤ ∆. By Axiom 1, Sk({n, k}, c′) ≤ Sk({n, k}, c¯) =
sk. So agent k rejects when y is proposed, contradiction.
If
∑
j:j<k sj >
∑
j:j<k yj then ∃∆ ∈ R++ s.t
∑
j:j<k sj >
∑
j:j<k yj + ∆. Now
c′n = c¯n+∆, c
′
k ≥ c¯k and c′k− c¯k ≤ ∆. By Axiom 1, Sk({n, k}, c′) ≤ Sk({n, k}, c¯)+
∆. Therefore yk ≤ sk + ∆ and
∑
j∈I\{n}
sj =
∑
j:j<k
sj + sk +
∑
j:k+1≤j≤n−1
sj =
∑
j:j<k
yj + ∆ + sk +
∑
j:k+1≤j≤n−1
yj
≥
∑
j:j<k
yj + yk +
∑
j:k+1≤j≤n−1
yj =
∑
j∈I\{n}
yj.
So agent n cannot collect more by proposing y instead of s, contradiction.
ii) Let yk < sk
But
∑
j∈I\{n} sj <
∑
j∈I\{n} yj. So there must bem ∈ I s.t ym > sm. Now take the
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largest such m. When y is proposed, agent m pays min{ym, sm({m,n}, c′)} = yk,
where
c′n = cn −
∑
j:j<m
yj −
∑
j:m+1≤j≤k
yj −
∑
j:k+1≤j≤n−1
sj,
c′m =
cm − ∑
j:j<m
yj − max
l:m+1≤l≤n−1
( ∑
j:m+1≤j≤l
yj − (cl − cm)
)
+

+
.
When s is proposed,agentm pays min{sm, Sk({m,n}, c¯)} = sk = Sk({n, k}, c¯),
where
c¯n = cn −
∑
j:j<m
sj −
∑
j:m+1≤j≤k
sj −
∑
j:k+1≤j≤n−1
sj,
c¯m =
cm − ∑
j:j<m
sj − max
l:m+1≤l≤n−1
( ∑
j:m+1≤j≤l
sj − (cl − cm)
)
+

+
.
Denote
 =
∑
j∈I\{n}
yj −
∑
j∈I\{n}
sj, ∆ = ym − sm, e =
∑
j:m+1≤j≤k
sj −
∑
j:m+1≤j≤k
sj
where ,∆, e ∈ R++. Then,
∑
j∈I\{m,n}
yj =
∑
j∈I\{m,n}
sj + (−∆),
c¯n = c
′
n + (−∆) and
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∑
j:j<m
yj + ym +
∑
j:m+1≤j≤k
yj +
∑
j:k+1≤j≤n−1
yj + yn =
∑
j:j<m
sj + sm +
∑
j:m+1≤j≤k
sj +
∑
j:k+1≤j≤n−1
sj + sn.
So, ∑
j:j<m
yj =
∑
j:j<m
sj + e+ (−∆)
whereas
0 ≤ max
l:m+1≤l≤n−1
( ∑
j:m+1≤j≤l
sj − (cl − cm)
)
+
−
max
l:m+1≤l≤n−1
( ∑
j:m+1≤j≤l
yj − (cl − cm)
)
+
≤ e.
Case 1) If  > ∆ , then c¯m ≥ c′m, c¯n = c′n + (−∆). Define
c′′ = (c′m, c
′
n + (−∆)) = (c′m, c¯n)
Then, Sm({m,n}, c′′) ≥ Sm({m,n}, c′) by Axiom 1. By Axiom 2, Sm({m,n}, c¯) ≥
Sm({m,n}, c′′). We know that sm = Sm({m,n}, c¯) ≥ Sm({m,n}, c′) ≥ ym. But
ym > sm, contradiction.
Case 2) If  ≤ ∆
c′m − (∆− ) = max
{
0, cm −
∑
j:j<m
yj − max
l:m+1≤l≤n−1
( ∑
j:m+1≤j≤l
yj − (cl − cm)
)
+
}
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= max
{
− (∆− ), cm −
∑
j:j<m
sj − e+ (∆− )
− max
l:m+1≤l≤n−1
( ∑
j:m+1≤j≤l
yj − (cl − cm)
)
+
− (∆− )
}
= max
{
− (∆− ), cm −
∑
j:j<m
sj − e− max
l:m+1≤l≤n−1
( ∑
j:m+1≤j≤l
yj − (cl − cm)
)
+
}
≤ max
{
0, cm −
∑
j:j<m
sj − max
l:m+1≤l≤n−1
( ∑
j:m+1≤j≤l
yj − (cl − cm)
)
+
}
.
c′m − (∆− ) ≤ c¯m. So, c′m − c¯m ≤ ∆− . We also have c′n = c¯n + (∆− ).
Define c′′ = c¯+(∆−). By Axiom 1, Sm({m,n}, c′′) ≤ Sm({m,n}, c¯)+(∆−)
and by Axiom 2, Sm({m,n}, c′) ≤ Sm({m,n}, c′′).
Then, Sm({m,n}, c′) ≤ Sm({m,n}, c¯) + (∆− ). Therefore, Sm({m,n}, c′) ≤
Sm + ∆−  and Sm({m,n}, c′) ≤ ym −  < ym, contradiction.
So agent n can collect the maximum amount she can collect in this game by
proposing s. Therefore S(I, c) is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, SPNE,
outcome of the game.
Corollary. Axioms 1, 2 and downstream subtraction consistency are preserved
in all convex combinations of solution concepts which satisfy them. CEC, slack
maximizer, priority rule and their convex combinations give us a SPNE outcome
of the noncooperative game for any given airport problem.
Proposition 2. For any airport problem (I, c), sequential full contributions solu-
tion concept gives SFC(I, c), which is a SPNE outcome of the game G(I, c, SFC).
Proof. Let (I, c) be an airport problem. Assume ∃i ∈ I\{n} such that ci = cn.
Now denote k = mini∈I\{n}{i : ci = cn}. Let y be a proposal which is accepted
by all responders. Then for each agent i ∈ {k, . . . , n− 1}, we have
yi ≤ 1
2
(
cn −
∑
j:k≤j≤n+1
yj + yi −
∑
j:j<k
yj
)
.
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This inequality implies
∑
j:k≤j≤n−1
yj ≤ 1
2
(
(n− k − 2)
(
cn −
∑
j:k≤j≤n−1
yj −
∑
j:j<k
yj
)
+
∑
j:k≤j≤n−1
yj
)
,
∑
j:k≤j≤n−1
yj ≤ n− k − 2
n− k − 1
(
cn −
∑
j:j<k
yj
)
,
∑
j∈I\{n}
yj ≤ n− k − 2
n− k − 1
(
cn −
∑
j:j<k
yj
)
+
∑
j:j<k
yj and
∑
j∈I\{n}
yj ≤ n− k − 2
n− k − 1cn +
1
n− k − 1
∑
j:j<k
yj.
Right side increases with
∑
j:j<k yj. So, in order to collect the maximum
amount, agent n should collect the maximum
∑
j:j<k yj.
For any agent i ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}, ci −
∑
j:j<i yj ≥ yi Hence the maximum
amount to be collected is ck − 1. By proposing SFC(I, c) agent n collects
n− k − 2
n− k − 1cn +
1
n− k − 1ck−1.
We have already shown that agent n cannot collect more than this amount.
If @i ∈ I\{n} s.t. ci = cn, then ci −
∑
j:j<i yj ≥ yi,∀i ∈ I\{n}.
So agent n cannot collect more than cn−1. In both cases agent n collects
the maximum amount by proposing SFC(I, c). Therefore SFC(I, c) is a SPNE
outcome of the game G(I, c, SFC).
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Corollary. The set of axioms in Theorem 1 is sufficient, but not all of them
are necessary. Proposition 2 is an example, since SFC solution concept does not
satisfy Axiom 2.
Definition. For each airport problem (I, c) and each i ∈ I where i is not the
last agent with I ′ ≡ I\{i}, if x = S(I, c) implies x′I = S(d(I, i, c, x)), we call the
solution concept S, DS semiconsistent.
Clearly DS consistency implies DS semiconsistency.
So far, we only used DS consistency. But in all our results, agent n was not
leaving the problem. If DS consistency in previous results is replaced by DS
semiconsistency, they would still hold.
Definition. For each airport problem (I, c) ∈ C ⊂ C and each i ∈ I where i is
not the last agent with I ′ ≡ I\{i}, if x = S(I, c) implies d(I, i, c, x) ∈ C and
x′I = S(d(I, i, c, x)), we call the solution concept S, DS semiconsistent for C.
3.4 Uniqueness of the Equilibria
Now let us check the uniqueness of the SPNE outcomes discussed above.
Example 1. Consider the airport problem (I, c) = ({1, 2, 3, 4}, (2, 3, 6, 7))
CEC(I, c) = (3
2
, 3
2
, 2, 2).
For two agents problems, under CEC first agent pays the minimum of her own
cost and half of the total cost and second agent pays the rest.
If agent 4 offers x = (1, 2, 2, 2) in the game above, in the first stage,
c′4 = 7− 3 = 4,
c′3 = 6− 3 = 3.
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Agent 3 pays 4
2
= 2. In the second stage,
c′4 = 7− 3 = 4,
c′2 = 3− 1 = 2.
Agent 2 pays 2. In the third stage,
c′4 = 7− 4 = 3,
c′1 = 2− 1 = 1.
Agent 1 pays 1. Hence this offer will be accepted. Since agent 4 collects as
much as she does by offering CEC(I, c), this allocation is also a best response
for her. Therefore (1, 2, 2, 2) is a SPNE outcome of the game although it is not
the CEC(I, c). So CEC(I, c) is not the unique SPNE outcome of the game.
Example 2. Consider the airport problem (I, c) = ({1, 2, 3}), (5, 10, 15)} and
the order 1 ≺ 2 ≺ 3. D≺(I, c) = (5, 5, 5). In the noncooperative game where
conflicts are resolved according to this priority rule, let agent 3 propose (3, 7, 5).
In the first stage,
c′3 = 15− 3 = 12,
c′2 = 10− 3 = 7.
So agent 2 pays 7. In the second stage,
c′3 = 15− 7 = 8,
c′1 = 5− 2 = 3.
So agent 1 pays 3. (3, 7, 5) is accepted by all agents and agent 3 collects as
much as she does by offering D≺(I, c). Therefore, (3, 7, 5) is a SPNE outcome.
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Hence D≺(I, c) is not the unique SPNE outcome of the game.
Example 3. Consider the airport problem (I, c) = ({1, 2, 3}, (3, 5, 10)). SFC(I, c)
=(3, 2, 5).
If agent 3 offers (1, 4, 5); in the first stage,
c′3 = 10− 3 = 7,
c′2 = 5− 1 = 4.
So agent 2 pays 4. In the second stage,
c′3 = 10− 2 = 8,
c′2 = 3− 2 = 1.
So agent 1 pays 1. (1, 4, 5) is accepted and agent 3 collect 5 from the rest. She
could collect 5 if she proposes SFC(I, c). Therefore, (3, 7, 5) is a SPNE outcome.
Hence SFC(I,c) is not the unique SPNE outcome of the game.
For two of the solution concepts we have discussed before, we already have a
characterization of the SPNE’s.
Theorem 2 (Arin et.al. 1997). Let (I, c) be an airport problem and G(I, c, SM)
its associated noncooperative game where every two-agent problem is solved by ap-
plying the slack maximizer solution. Then the unique SPNE outcome of G(I, c, SM)
is SM(I, c), i.e. the nucleolus of (I, c).
Given an airport problem (I, c), define B(I, c) such that B(I, c) = {x ∈
Core(I, c) : xi ≤ xn,∀i ∈ I}.
Theorem 3 (Arin et. al. , 1997). Let (I, c) be an airport problem and G(I, c, CEC)
its associated noncooperative game where every two-agent problem is solved by ap-
plying the constrained equal contributions solution concept. Then, z is a SPNE
outcome if and only if z ∈ B(I, c) and zn = xn where x = CEC(I, c).
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3.5 Three-Agent Case
Proposition 3. Let S be a solution concept which satisfies Axiom 1. If S(I, c)
is the unique SPNE outcome of the associated noncooperative game G(I, c, S) for
any airport problem (I, c) where |I| ≤ 3, then S is DS semiconsistent for all
airport problems (I, c) where |I| ≤ 3.
Proof. Now assume that S is not DS semiconsistent for all airport problems (I, c)
where |I| ≤ 3. Then ∃ an airport problem (I, c) and i ∈ I such that i is not the last
agent in I and x = S(I, c) does not imply SI′(d(I, i, c, x)) = xI′ i.e. ∃j ∈ I\{i}
s.t. xj 6= Sj(d(I, i, c, x)).
i) Let |I| = 2. This is not possible due to the efficiency condition.
ii) Let |I| = 3. Namely I = {i, j, n}.
Case 1) i < j < n
c′n = cn − xi
c′j = cj − xi
Sj({j, n}, (c′n, c′j)) = sj 6= xj. Since x is a SPNE outcome, sj > xj.
c′n = cn − xj,
c′i = ci − (xj − cj + ci)+.
If agent n proposes (xi, sj, cn−xi−sj), agent j agrees to pay sj. In the second
stage,
c¯n = cn − sj,
c¯i = ci − (sj − cj + ci)+.
Denote sj−xj = ∆ where ∆ ∈ R+. By Axiom 1, Si({i, n}, c′) ≤ Si({i, n}, c¯)+
∆ so S({i, n}, c¯)− S({i, n}, c′) ≤ ∆
If this inequality holds strictly, then x is not a SPNE. If they are equal, then
x is not the unique SPNE, contradiction.
Case 2) j < i < n
This case is almost the same. (sj, xi, cn−xi− sj) 6= x and (sj, xi, cn−xi− sj)
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is a SPNE outcome, contradiction.
Therefore S must be DS semiconsistent for all airport problems (I, c) where
|I| ≤ 3.
Axiom 3. Let ({i, j}, c) be an airport problem, i < j, S be a solution concept.
We assume that for any ({i, j}, c′′) and ({i, j}, c′) ∈ C s.t. c′ = c+ c′′, c′′j > 0, we
have Si({i, j}, c′) < Si({i, j}, c) + c′′j .
Proposition 4. Let S be a solution concept which satisfies Axiom 3. If S(I, c) is
a SPNE outcome of the associated noncooperative game G(I, C, S) for any airport
problem (I, c) where |I| ≤ 3, then S is DS semiconsistent for all airport problems
(I, c) where |I| ≤ 3.
Proof. This proof is very similar to the proof of Proposition 3.
3.6 First Agent Proposer Game
Given an airport problem (I, c) and a solution concept S, we can change the as-
sociated noncooperative game described above and define a new game H(I, C, S)
where agent 1 makes the proposal.
By applying downstream-subtraction repeatedly, we can suggest that it is
convenient to define two agent problems in the game as ({1, i}, c′) where
c′1 = minl:l 6=16=i
{
c1, cl −
∑
j:2≤j≤i−1 xj −
∑
j:i+1≤j≤l xj
}
and
c′i = minl:i<l
{
ci −
∑
j:2≤j≤i−1 xj, cl −
∑
j:2≤j≤i−1 xj −
∑
j:i+1≤j≤l−1 xj
}
.
It can also be checked if our results still hold, if not which new assumptions
should be made. The question is left here for further research.
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CHAPTER 4
ANOTHER NONCOOPERATIVE GAME
4.1 New Game
An airport problem (I, c) and a solution concept S is given. We define a nonco-
operative game Γ(I, c, s) which is very similar to the ones above. Agent n makes
a proposal x1 starting with agent n− 1 agents respond in an order according to
their costs.
If agent i rejects at stage t, then a two-person problem is defined as ({i, n}, c′)
where
c′n = cn −
∑
j 6=i,n
xt−1j ,
c′i =
(
ci =
∑
j 6=i,n
xt−1j
)
+
.
Note that c′i ≤ c′n.
Then S is applied to this small problem, agent i pays and leaves, the proposal
is adjusted accordingly.
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4.2 Uniform-Subtraction
Given an airport problem (I, c), an allocation x ∈ X (I, c) and i ∈ I, the uniform -
subtraction2 reduced problem r(I, i, c, x) is an airport problem with the agent set
I ′ ≡ I \ {i} and cost vector c′ ∈ RI′+ where c′ is defined as follows: For any j ∈ I ′
c′j ≡

max{cj − xi, 0} if ci < cj
cj − xi if ci ≥ cj
Let (I, c) be an airport problem. For each i ∈ I, if agent i is not the unique
agent such that maxj∈I cj = ci, if x ≡ S(I, c) implies xI′ = S(r(I, i, c, x)), then
we call the solution concept S uniform-subtraction consistent.
4.3 Results
Claim 4. Let (I, c) be an airport problem and let I¯ ⊂ I. Now agents in I\I¯ leave
the game in an order ≺ and we apply uniform-subtraction repeatedly. We obtain
a new problem (I¯ , c′).
If agents in I\I¯, instead leave in an order ≺¯ and we apply uniform-subtraction
repeatedly. We obtain a new problem (I¯ , C¯).
Then c′ = c¯. In other words, order of leave is not important in uniform-
subtraction.
Proof. Straightforward
Claim 5. Let (I, c) be an airport problem, x be an allocation for this problem.
For any i ∈ I\{n}, define c′ as
cn′ = cn −
∑
j 6=i,n
xj,
ci′ = (ci −
∑
j 6=i,n
xj)+.
2This concept is first defined by Potters and Sudho¨lter (1999).
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Now the problem ({i, n}, c′) is obtained from (I, c) by repeated Uniform-Subtraction
of all agents other than i and n w.r.t. x.
Proof. Straightforward.
Proposition 5. Let (I, c) be an airport problem, Γ(I, c, s) be an associated non-
cooperative game, where S satisfies Axiom 1. Let y ∈ X (I, c) be offered by agent
n in the beginning of the game and x ∈ X (I, c) be the outcome, when all agents
respond rationally. Then accepting is a best response for all responders i ∈ I \{n}
when x is proposed directly in the first stage by agent n.
Proof. Very similar to the proof of Proposition 1.
Corollary. Let (I, c) be an airport problem, Γ(I, c, s) be an associated noncoop-
erative game, where S satisfies Axiom 1. If x is a SPNE outcome of Γ(I, c, S),
then there exists a SPNE where x is proposed by n and accepted by all agents.
Theorem 4. Let (I, c) be an airport problem, Γ(I, c, s) be an associated nonco-
operative game, where S satisfies Axiom 1. Now S(I, c) is a SPNE outcome of
the game Γ(I, c, S).
Proof. Denote s ≡ S(I, c).
Let z be a proposal, where the outcome of the game is y, when responders
act rationally. Then by Proposition 5, y will be accepted if it is proposed in the
beginning.
Let y 6= s and yn < sn.
So
∑
j:j 6=n
sj <
∑
j:j 6=n
yj. Therefore, there must be an agent k ∈ I\{n} such that
yk > sk.
When y is proposed agent k pays min{yk, sk({k, n}, c′)} = yk where
c′n = cn −
∑
j 6=k,n
yj,
c′k =
(
ck −
∑
j 6=k,n
yj
)
+
.
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When s is proposed agent k pays min{sk, sk({k, n}, c¯)} = sk = sk({k, n}, c¯)
where
c¯n = cn −
∑
j 6=k,n
sj,
c′k =
(
ck −
∑
j 6=k,n
sj
)
+
.
If
∑
j:j 6=n,k
sj ≤
∑
j:j 6=n,k
yj, then by Axiom 1 yk ≤ sk({k, n}, c′) ≤ sk({k, n}, c¯) =
sk, contradiction.
If
∑
j:j 6=n,k
sj >
∑
j:j 6=n,k
yj, then denote ∆ ≡
∑
j:j 6=n,k
sj −
∑
j:j 6=n,k
yj. By Axiom 1,
sk({k, n}, c′) ≤ Sk({k, n}, c¯) + ∆. Therefore yk ≤ sk + ∆.∑
j:j 6=n
yj =
∑
j:j 6=n,k
sj −∆ + yk ≤
∑
j:j 6=n,k
sj −∆ + sk + ∆ =
∑
j:j 6=n
sj.
But
∑
j:j 6=n
yj >
∑
j:j 6=n
sj, contradiction.
Therefore S(I, c) is a SPNE outcome of the game Γ(I, c, S).
Theorem 5. Let (I, c) be an airport problem, Γ(I, c, S) be an associated nonco-
operative game, where S satisfies uniform-subtraction consistency, Axiom 1 and
Axiom 3. Now S(I, c) is the unique SPNE outcome of the game Γ(I, c, S).
Proof. Similar to the proof of Theorem 4.
Among the seven solution concepts described above, only CEB satisfies uniform-
subtraction consistency (Thomson (2005)).
Now let us check if it satisfies Axiom 3.
For the two agent case CEB gives us
(
c1
2
, c2 − c12
)
.
CEB({1, 2}, c′) =
(
c1+c′′1
2
, c2 + c
′′
2 − c12 − c
′′
1
2
)
where c′ = c + c′′, (I, c), (I, c′),
(I, c′′) ∈ C.
c′′1 ≥ 0 c′′2 > 0 and c′′2 ≥ c′′1
c1+c′′1
2
< c1
2
+ c′′2 =
c1+2c′′2
2
. Therefore CEB satisfies Axiom 3.
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Corollary. Let (I, c) be an airport problem and Γ(I, c, CEB) its associated non-
cooperative game where every two-agent problem is solved by applying the con-
strained equal benefits solution. Then the unique SPNE outcome of Γ(I, c, CEB)
is CEB(I, c).
It is an interesting observation that CEB and Slack Maximizer solutions gives
us the same allocation in two-agent problems.
Due to the definition of Uniform-Subtraction consistency, we can only consider
last agent proposer games if we want to utilize this concept.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
In this thesis, we combined the cooperative and the noncooperative approach
to airport problems. We defined noncooperative games in which conflicts are re-
solved using a cooperative solution concept. We investigated how the cooperative
solution and the set of Nash equilibria are related. Instead of characterizing the
Nash equilibria of the game associated to a specific solution concept selected from
the literature, we obtained general results.
We showed that if a solution concept satisfies downstream-subtraction consis-
tency, weaker versions of individual cost monotonicity and weak cost monotonic-
ity, then cooperative solutions are in the set of the Nash equilibrium outcomes of
the associated game.
Additionally, we modified the game. For this modified game, we proved that
if a solution concept satisfies a weaker version of weak cost monotonicity, then
cooperative solutions are in the set of the Nash equilibrium outcomes of the
associated game. We also showed that if a solution concept satisfies uniform-
subtraction consistency, a weak version of weak cost monotonicity and a related
version of cost monotonicity, then the cooperative solution is the unique Nash
equilibrium outcome of the associated game.
We concluded that noncooperative games can be used as an implementation
tool for cooperative solutions in airport problems.
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